trustbridge/nss-cmake-static: nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c comparison

comparison nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c @ 0:1e5118fa0cb1

This is NSS with a Cmake Buildsyste To compile a static NSS library for Windows we've used the Chromium-NSS fork and added a Cmake buildsystem to compile it statically for Windows. See README.chromium for chromium changes and README.trustbridge for our modifications.

author	Andre Heinecke <andre.heinecke@intevation.de>
date	Mon, 28 Jul 2014 10:47:06 +0200
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--1:000000000000
+:1e5118fa0cb1
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+* This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
+*
+* For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
+*   This implementation has two slots:
+*	slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
+*   It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
+*   It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
+*   not have any token storage.
+*	slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
+*   can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
+*   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+*
+*   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+*   that created or generated them.
+*/
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+#include "lowkeyi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secdig.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h"	/* We do PBE below */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "alghmac.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "prprf.h"
+#define __PASTE(x,y)    x##y
+/*
+* we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
+* definitions for them...
+*/
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#define CK_EXTERN extern
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
+		CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func)
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST	1
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+typedef struct {
+PRUint8 client_version[2];
+PRUint8 random[46];
+} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
+static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+return;
+}
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \
+printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
+str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \
+for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \
+	    printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \
+} \
+printf("\n")
+#else
+#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
+#endif
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+/*
+* free routines.... Free local type  allocated data, and convert
+* other free routines to the destroy signature.
+*/
+static void
+sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
+{
+nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
+}
+static void
+sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+PORT_Free(data);
+}
+/*
+* map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
+* functions to CKR_xxx.  return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
+* compatibility.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
+{
+switch (error) {
+	case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
+	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:  /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
+	    return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+	case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
+	    return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+	case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
+	    return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+	case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
+	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+	case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
+	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+	    return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+	case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
+	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY:  /* an EC public key that fails validation */
+	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;  /* the closest error code */
+	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
+	    return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	/* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */
+	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
+	    return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
+	    return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
+	/* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
+	case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
+	    return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+}
+return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
+{
+switch (error) {
+	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
+	    return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+	default:
+	    return sftk_MapCryptError(error);
+}
+}
+/*
+* return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for
+* backward compatibilty.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
+{
+CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
+if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
+	crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+* turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
+* Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
+{
+unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
+unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
+unsigned char enc_src[8];
+unsigned char enc_dest[8];
+unsigned int leng,i;
+DESContext *descx;
+SECStatus rv;
+/* zero the parity bits */
+for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
+	enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
+}
+/* encrypt with key 1 */
+descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
+if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+/* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
+for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
+	if (i & 1) {
+	    enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
+	} else {
+	    enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
+	}
+}
+/* encrypt with key 2 */
+descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
+if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+/* set the corret parity on our new des key */
+sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
+{
+SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKObject *object;
+SFTKFreeStatus status;
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (slot == NULL) {
+	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
+* requested object.
+*/
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) {
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session);
+if (object == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
+if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
+				(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	sftk_FreeObject(object);
+	return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+}
+/* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
+if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
+				(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	sftk_FreeObject(object);
+	return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
+}
+sftk_DeleteObject(session,object);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+/*
+* get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
+* 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
+* should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
+* destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
+* be in the data base.
+*/
+status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
+return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Utilities ************************
+*/
+/*
+* Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
+* HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
+*/
+static HASH_HashType
+GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
+switch (mech) {
+case CKM_SHA_1:
+case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
+return HASH_AlgSHA1;
+case CKM_SHA224:
+case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
+return HASH_AlgSHA224;
+case CKM_SHA256:
+case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
+return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+case CKM_SHA384:
+case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
+return HASH_AlgSHA384;
+case CKM_SHA512:
+case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
+return HASH_AlgSHA512;
+default:
+return HASH_AlgNULL;
+}
+}
+/*
+* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
+*/
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
+{
+if (!params) {
+return PR_FALSE;
+}
+if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
+GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+return PR_FALSE;
+}
+return PR_TRUE;
+}
+/*
+* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
+*/
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
+{
+if (!params) {
+return PR_FALSE;
+}
+/* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
+* state:
+*   If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
+*   ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
+*/
+if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
+(GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+(GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+(params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
+(params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
+return PR_FALSE;
+}
+return PR_TRUE;
+}
+/*
+* return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+*/
+SFTKSessionContext *
+sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
+{
+switch (type) {
+	case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+	case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+	    return session->enc_context;
+	case SFTK_HASH:
+	    return session->hash_context;
+	case SFTK_SIGN:
+	case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+	case SFTK_VERIFY:
+	case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+	    return session->hash_context;
+}
+return NULL;
+}
+/*
+* change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+*/
+void
+sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
+						SFTKSessionContext *context)
+{
+switch (type) {
+	case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+	case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+	    session->enc_context = context;
+	    break;
+	case SFTK_HASH:
+	    session->hash_context = context;
+	    break;
+	case SFTK_SIGN:
+	case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+	case SFTK_VERIFY:
+	case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+	    session->hash_context = context;
+	    break;
+}
+return;
+}
+/*
+* code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
+* and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
+* and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
+* and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
+* pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+	SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type);
+/* make sure the context is valid */
+if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+}
+*contextPtr = context;
+if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
+	*sessionPtr = session;
+} else {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+}
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
+*  Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
+*/
+static void
+sftk_TerminateOp( SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
+SFTKSessionContext *context )
+{
+sftk_FreeContext( context );
+sftk_SetContextByType( session, ctype, NULL );
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Encrypt ************************
+*/
+/*
+* All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
+* all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+		 SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr,
+		 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
+		 CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+SFTKAttribute *att;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+/* We can only init if there is not current context active */
+if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) {
+	return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+}
+/* find the key */
+if (keyPtr) {
+key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
+if (key == NULL) {
+	    return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	}
+	/* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
+	if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType))
+					|| !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) {
+	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	    return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	}
+	/* get the key type */
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	    return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	}
+	PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
+	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	}
+	PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	*keyPtr = key;
+}
+/* allocate the context structure */
+context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
+if (context == NULL) {
+	if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+context->type = ctype;
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
+context->cipherInfo = NULL;
+context->hashInfo = NULL;
+context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+context->padDataLength = 0;
+context->key = key;
+context->blockSize = 0;
+context->maxLen = 0;
+*contextPtr = context;
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+static int
+sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
+{
+switch (mechanism) {
+case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+case CKM_AES_CBC:
+	return NSS_AES_CBC;
+case CKM_AES_ECB:
+	return NSS_AES;
+case CKM_AES_CTS:
+	return NSS_AES_CTS;
+case CKM_AES_CTR:
+	return NSS_AES_CTR;
+case CKM_AES_GCM:
+	return NSS_AES_GCM;
+}
+return -1;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
+maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
+return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+(const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
+info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
+output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
+maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
+rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+(const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
+info->params->ulSourceDataLen,
+output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(const unsigned char *key,
+				    unsigned int keyLen,
+				    const CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS* params)
+{
+SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx;
+if (params->ulIvLen != sizeof(ctx->nonce)) {
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+	return NULL;
+}
+ctx = PORT_New(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info);
+if (ctx == NULL) {
+	return NULL;
+}
+if (ChaCha20Poly1305_InitContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, key, keyLen,
+				     params->ulTagLen) != SECSuccess) {
+	PORT_Free(ctx);
+	return NULL;
+}
+memcpy(ctx->nonce, params->pIv, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
+if (params->ulAADLen > sizeof(ctx->ad)) {
+	/* Need to allocate an overflow buffer for the additional data. */
+	ctx->adOverflow = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(params->ulAADLen);
+	if (!ctx->adOverflow) {
+	    PORT_Free(ctx);
+	    return NULL;
+	}
+	memcpy(ctx->adOverflow, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+} else {
+	ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+	memcpy(ctx->ad, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+}
+ctx->adLen = params->ulAADLen;
+return ctx;
+}
+static void
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+				     PRBool freeit)
+{
+ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, PR_FALSE);
+if (ctx->adOverflow != NULL) {
+	PORT_Free(ctx->adOverflow);
+	ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+}
+ctx->adLen = 0;
+if (freeit) {
+	PORT_Free(ctx);
+}
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+			      unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+			      unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+			      const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+if (ad == NULL) {
+	ad = ctx->ad;
+}
+return ChaCha20Poly1305_Seal(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+				 maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+				 sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+			      unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+			      unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+			      const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+if (ad == NULL) {
+	ad = ctx->ad;
+}
+return ChaCha20Poly1305_Open(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+				 maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+				 sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+/** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
+*
+* Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
+* Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
+*  ciphers MAC'ing.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
+CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+		 SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+SFTKAttribute *att;
+CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
+SECItem rc5Key;
+#endif
+CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
+unsigned char newdeskey[24];
+PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE;
+int t;
+crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage );
+if (crv != CKR_OK)
+	return crv;
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type,
+			isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	if (isEncrypt) {
+	    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	    if (pubKey == NULL) {
+	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
+	    context->cipherInfo =  (void *)pubKey;
+	    context->update = (SFTKCipher)
+		(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+					? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
+	} else {
+	    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	    if (privKey == NULL) {
+	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+	    context->cipherInfo =  (void *)privKey;
+	    context->update = (SFTKCipher)
+		(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+					? sftk_RSADecryptRaw : sftk_RSADecrypt);
+	}
+	context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+	break;
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
+	    !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	if (isEncrypt) {
+	    SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo);
+	    if (info == NULL) {
+	        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	        break;
+	    }
+	    info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+	    info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+	    if (info->key == NULL) {
+	        PORT_Free(info);
+	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	        break;
+	    }
+	    context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
+	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
+	    context->cipherInfo = info;
+	} else {
+	    SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo);
+	    if (info == NULL) {
+	        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	        break;
+	    }
+	    info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+	    info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+	    if (info->key == NULL) {
+	        PORT_Free(info);
+	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	        break;
+	    }
+	    context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
+	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
+	    context->cipherInfo = info;
+	}
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
+	break;
+case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_RC2_ECB:
+case CKM_RC2_CBC:
+	context->blockSize = 8;
+	if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8;
+	context->cipherInfo =
+	    RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			      att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
+			      pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 :
+			      NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_RC5_ECB:
+case CKM_RC5_CBC:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
+	rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
+	rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
+	   rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv,
+		 pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+#endif
+case CKM_RC4:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo =
+	    RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			      att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;  /* WRONG !!! */
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
+case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
+	if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	goto finish_des;
+case CKM_DES_ECB:
+	if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	t = NSS_DES;
+	goto finish_des;
+case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_DES_CBC:
+	if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	t = NSS_DES_CBC;
+	goto finish_des;
+case CKM_DES3_ECB:
+	if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
+	goto finish_des;
+case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+	if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+finish_des:
+	context->blockSize = 8;
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
+(t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
+	    /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
+	    memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
+	    memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
+	    useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
+	} else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
+	    crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
+		useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt);
+	if (useNewKey)
+	    memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_SEED_CBC:
+if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+	     pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+break;
+}
+/* fall thru */
+case CKM_SEED_ECB:
+	context->blockSize = 16;
+	if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
+	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
+	    pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
+	    isEncrypt);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
+	if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+		 pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
+	context->blockSize = 16;
+	if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
+	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
+	    pMechanism->mechanism ==
+	    CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
+	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ?
+					Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_AES_ECB:
+case CKM_AES_CBC:
+	context->blockSize = 16;
+case CKM_AES_CTS:
+case CKM_AES_CTR:
+case CKM_AES_GCM:
+	if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
+	    context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	}
+	if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
+	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
+	    sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
+	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS)) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	if (key_type != CKK_NSS_CHACHA20) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(
+		(unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+		(CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS*) pMechanism->pParameter);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ?
+					sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt :
+					sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
+	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
+	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	context->blockSize = 8;
+	if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
+	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
+	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
+	                                          : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
+	break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+sftk_FreeContext(context);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+		 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+						SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+}
+/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+					CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen,i;
+unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+SECStatus rv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (!pEncryptedPart) {
+	if (context->doPad) {
+	    CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
+	    CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize;
+	    *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
+	    return CKR_OK;
+	}
+	*pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+	return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* do padding */
+if (context->doPad) {
+	/* deal with previous buffered data */
+	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+	    /* fill in the padded to a full block size */
+	    for (i=context->padDataLength;
+			(ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+		context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
+		ulPartLen--;
+		context->padDataLength++;
+	    }
+	    /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
+	    if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
+		*pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+		return CKR_OK;
+	    }
+	    /* encrypt the current padded data */
+	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
+		&padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
+							context->blockSize);
+	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+		return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    }
+	    pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
+	    maxout -= padoutlen;
+	}
+	/* save the residual */
+	context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
+	if (context->padDataLength) {
+	    PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
+			&pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
+							context->padDataLength);
+	    ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+	}
+	/* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
+	if (ulPartLen == 0) {
+	    *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
+	    return CKR_OK;
+	}
+}
+/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
+					&outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
+*pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
+return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen,i;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
+	/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+	if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
+	    *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
+	    contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
+	}
+	goto finish;
+}
+/* do padding */
+if (context->doPad) {
+	unsigned char  padbyte = (unsigned char)
+				(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
+	/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
+	for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+	    context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
+	}
+	rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart,
+			&outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+	if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
+}
+finish:
+if (contextFinished)
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+		   CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
+		   CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+CK_RV crv2;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+SECItem   pText;
+pText.type = siBuffer;
+pText.data = pData;
+pText.len  = ulDataLen;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (!pEncryptedData) {
+	*pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen :
+		ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
+	goto finish;
+}
+if (context->doPad) {
+	if (context->multi) {
+	    CK_ULONG finalLen;
+	    /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+	     * code deal with it */
+	    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	    crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
+	                            pulEncryptedDataLen);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+	    	*pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
+	    maxoutlen      -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+	    pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+	    finalLen = maxoutlen;
+	    crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
+	    if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
+	    	*pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
+	    return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
+	}
+	/* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
+	** and only update.  There will be no final.
+	*/
+	PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
+	if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+	    CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
+	    CK_ULONG padding   = context->blockSize - remainder;
+	    pText.len += padding;
+	    pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+	    if (pText.data) {
+		memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
+		memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
+	    } else {
+		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	    }
+	}
+}
+/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
+rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
+			    &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
+crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+*pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
+if (pText.data != pData)
+	PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+fail:
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Decrypt ************************
+*/
+/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+			 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
+						SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+}
+/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
+				CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+SECStatus rv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+/* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
+PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0)
+		|| context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
+if (context->doPad) {
+	/* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
+	 * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
+	 * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
+	 * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
+	 * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
+	 * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
+	 */
+	if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
+	    (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
+	    return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+	}
+}
+if (!pPart) {
+	if (context->doPad) {
+	    *pulPartLen =
+		ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
+	    return CKR_OK;
+	}
+	/* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
+	 * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
+	 * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
+	 */
+	*pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+	return CKR_OK;
+}
+if (context->doPad) {
+	/* first decrypt our saved buffer */
+	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
+		 maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+	    if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    pPart += padoutlen;
+	    maxout -= padoutlen;
+	}
+	/* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
+	PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
+				context->blockSize], context->blockSize);
+	context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
+	ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+}
+/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen,
+		 maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
+*pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
+return (rv == SECSuccess)  ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+*pulLastPartLen = 0;
+if (!pLastPart) {
+	/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+	if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
+	    *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
+	}
+	goto finish;
+}
+if (context->doPad) {
+	/* decrypt our saved buffer */
+	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+	    /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
+	     * buffer!!! */
+	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
+		 maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+		crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    } else {
+		unsigned int padSize =
+			    (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1];
+		if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
+		    crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+		} else {
+		    unsigned int i;
+		    unsigned int badPadding = 0;  /* used as a boolean */
+		    for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) {
+			badPadding |=
+			    (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1-i] ^
+			    padSize;
+		    }
+		    if (badPadding) {
+			crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+		    } else {
+			*pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+}
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+CK_RV crv2;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (!pData) {
+	*pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize;
+	goto finish;
+}
+if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
+	CK_ULONG finalLen;
+	/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+	 * code deal with it */
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
+							pData, pulDataLen);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK)
+	    *pulDataLen = 0;
+	maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
+	pData     += *pulDataLen;
+	finalLen = maxoutlen;
+	crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
+	if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
+	    *pulDataLen += finalLen;
+	return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
+}
+rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+					pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
+/* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
+crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
+	unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1];
+	if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
+	    crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+	} else {
+	    unsigned int i;
+	    unsigned int badPadding = 0;  /* used as a boolean */
+	    for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
+		badPadding |= (unsigned int) pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding;
+	    }
+	    if (badPadding) {
+		crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+	    } else {
+		outlen -= padding;
+	    }
+	}
+}
+*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Digest (HASH)  ************************
+*/
+/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+					CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+CHECK_FORK();
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL)
+	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+#define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \
+case mech: { \
+	mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
+	context->cipherInfo    = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \
+	context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \
+	context->currentMech   = mech; \
+	context->hashUpdate    = (SFTKHash)    mmm ## _Update; \
+	context->end           = (SFTKEnd)     mmm ## _End; \
+	context->destroy       = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
+	context->maxLen        = mmm ## _LENGTH; \
+if (mmm ## _ctx) \
+	    mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \
+	else  \
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+	break; \
+}
+switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
+INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2,    MD2)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5,    MD5)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1,  SHA1)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384)
+INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512)
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+sftk_FreeContext(context);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int digestLen;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (pDigest == NULL) {
+	*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+	goto finish;
+}
+/* do it: */
+(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
+/*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
+(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout);
+*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+					    CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+/* do it: */
+(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+unsigned int digestLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (pDigest != NULL) {
+(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
+} else {
+	*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+}
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+* these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
+* that use hashes as part of their operations.
+*/
+#define DOSUB(mmm) \
+static CK_RV \
+sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \
+mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
+context->hashInfo    = (void *)      mmm ## _ctx; \
+context->hashUpdate  = (SFTKHash)    mmm ## _Update; \
+context->end         = (SFTKEnd)     mmm ## _End; \
+context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
+if (!context->hashInfo) { \
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+} \
+mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \
+return CKR_OK; \
+}
+DOSUB(MD2)
+DOSUB(MD5)
+DOSUB(SHA1)
+DOSUB(SHA224)
+DOSUB(SHA256)
+DOSUB(SHA384)
+DOSUB(SHA512)
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SignCopy(
+	CK_ULONG *copyLen,
+	void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
+	unsigned int maxLength,
+	const unsigned char *hashResult,
+	unsigned int hashResultLength)
+{
+unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
+if (toCopy > maxLength) {
+	toCopy = maxLength;
+}
+if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
+	toCopy = hashResultLength;
+}
+memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
+if (outLength) {
+	*outLength = toCopy;
+}
+return SECSuccess;
+}
+/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
+				unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ;
+}
+/*
+* common HMAC initalization routine
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash,
+					SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+HMACContext *HMACcontext;
+CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash);
+PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
+/* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */
+if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) {
+	return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+}
+keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
+		(const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue,
+		keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
+context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
+	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
+	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+	}
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update;
+context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish;
+context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy;
+intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+if (intpointer == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+*intpointer = mac_size;
+context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
+context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
+context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp;
+context->maxLen = hashObj->length;
+HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+*  SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
+* hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
+*/
+/*
+* FROM SSL:
+* 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
+* We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
+* in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
+*/
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = {
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = {
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
+		unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+unsigned int out;
+info->begin(info->hashContext);
+info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
+info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
+info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
+info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize);
+*sigLen = info->macSize;
+return SECSuccess;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
+		unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+unsigned int out;
+info->begin(info->hashContext);
+info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
+info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
+info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
+info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ?
+						SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+/*
+* common HMAC initalization routine
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid,
+					SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+SFTKBegin begin;
+int padSize;
+SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
+	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+	begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin;
+	padSize = 40;
+} else {
+	crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+	begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin;
+	padSize = 48;
+}
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue,
+						 keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize);
+sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
+if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
+sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
+sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
+PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue,
+					keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
+sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
+sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
+sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
+sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
+sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo;
+context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
+context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign;
+context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify;
+context->maxLen = mac_size;
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Sign  ************************
+*/
+/**
+* Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
+*  @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
+*  @param keyUsage    check whether key allows this usage
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+						 SFTKContextType contextType)
+{
+CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
+CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
+CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
+CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
+#endif
+unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+unsigned int blockSize;
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes =
+	    ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_RC2_MAC:
+	/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+	 * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
+	rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
+				pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits;
+	PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
+	blockSize = 8;
+	break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes =
+	    ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_RC5_MAC:
+	/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+	 * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
+	rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
+	rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
+	rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
+	if( (blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE )
+return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
+	break;
+#endif
+/* add cast and idea later */
+case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_DES_MAC:
+	blockSize = 8;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_DES3_MAC:
+	blockSize = 8;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
+	blockSize = 8;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_SEED_MAC:
+	blockSize = 16;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
+	blockSize = 16;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
+	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_AES_MAC:
+	blockSize = 16;
+	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
+	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+	break;
+default:
+	return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+/* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
+*/
+if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
+mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
+else {
+if( mac_bytes > blockSize )
+return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+}
+crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
+CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
+keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE );
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL);
+/* this shouldn't happen! */
+PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+context->blockSize = blockSize;
+context->macSize = mac_bytes;
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+*/
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
+hash, hashLen);
+}
+/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
+static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
+{ DER_SEQUENCE,
+	  0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
+{ DER_OBJECT_ID,
+	  offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), },
+{ DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
+	  offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), },
+{ 0, }
+};
+/*
+* XXX OLD Template.  Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
+* remove this.
+*/
+static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
+{ DER_SEQUENCE,
+	  0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
+{ DER_INLINE,
+	  offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm),
+	  SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, },
+{ DER_OCTET_STRING,
+	  offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest), },
+{ 0, }
+};
+/*
+* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+*/
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
+unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+SECItem digder;
+PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+digder.data = NULL;
+arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+if (!arena) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* Construct digest info */
+di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
+if (!di) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
+rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
+if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/*
+** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
+** block
+*/
+rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
+digder.len);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+loser:
+SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+if (arena != NULL) {
+PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+inputLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
+params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+SECItem signature, digest;
+NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+signature.len = sigLen;
+digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+digest.len = dataLen;
+return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+}
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+SECItem signature, digest;
+SECStatus rv;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+signature.len = maxSigLen;
+digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+digest.len = dataLen;
+rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+	sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+*sigLen = signature.len;
+return rv;
+}
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+SECItem signature, digest;
+NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+signature.len = sigLen;
+digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+digest.len = dataLen;
+return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+}
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+SECItem signature, digest;
+SECStatus rv;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+signature.len = maxSigLen;
+digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+digest.len = dataLen;
+rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+	sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+}
+*sigLen = signature.len;
+return rv;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
+* types of signing:
+*	(1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
+*  to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
+*  encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
+*	(2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
+*  some sort of signature to the end.
+*	(3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
+*  and only the final block is part of the mac.
+*
+*  For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
+*  (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
+*  C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
+*  have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
+*
+*  For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
+*  multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
+*  calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
+*  operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
+*  opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
+*  copy (as is the case with HMAC).
+*/
+CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+		 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
+if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
+/* we're not using a block cipher mac */
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type,
+						CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \
+case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
+context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
+	crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAHashSign; \
+	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \
+	if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
+	info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
+	goto finish_rsa;
+switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
+INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASign;
+	goto finish_rsa;
+case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignRaw;
+finish_rsa:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	if (privKey == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
+	 * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
+	 * signature.
+	 */
+	if (info) {
+	    info->key = privKey;
+	    context->cipherInfo = info;
+	    context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+	} else {
+	    context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+	    context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
+	}
+	context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+	break;
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+	    !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);
+	if (info == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+	info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	if (info->key == NULL) {
+	    PORT_Free(info);
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = info;
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignPSS;
+	context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
+	break;
+case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_DSA:
+	if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
+	if (privKey == NULL) {
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+	context->update     = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
+	context->destroy    = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
+		(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+	context->maxLen     = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
+	context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_ECDSA:
+	if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
+	if (privKey == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+	context->update     = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub;
+	context->destroy    = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
+		(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+	context->maxLen     = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+	break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \
+case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \
+				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
+	break; \
+case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \
+	break;
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
+				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
+	break;
+case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
+					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
+					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL);
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256);
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+	    sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
+	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+	if (ctx == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+	    break;
+	}
+	intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+	if (intpointer == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+	context->cipherInfo    = intpointer;
+	context->hashInfo      = ctx;
+	context->currentMech   = pMechanism->mechanism;
+	context->hashUpdate    = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
+	context->hashdestroy   = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+	context->end           = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+	context->update        = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
+	context->destroy       = sftk_Space;
+	context->maxLen        = 64;
+	context->multi         = PR_TRUE;
+	break;
+}
+case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+	    sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
+	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+	if (ctx == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+	    break;
+	}
+	intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+	if (intpointer == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+	context->cipherInfo    = intpointer;
+	context->hashInfo      = ctx;
+	context->currentMech   = pMechanism->mechanism;
+	context->hashUpdate    = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
+	context->hashdestroy   = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+	context->end           = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+	context->update        = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
+	context->destroy       = sftk_Space;
+	context->maxLen        = 64;
+	context->multi         = PR_TRUE;
+	break;
+}
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	if (info) PORT_Free(info);
+sftk_FreeContext(context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/** MAC one block of data by block cipher
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACBlock( SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk )
+{
+unsigned int outlen;
+return ( SECSuccess == (ctx->update)( ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
+SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize ))
+? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
+*
+*  Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACFinal( SFTKSessionContext *ctx )
+{
+unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
+/* pad and proceed the residual */
+if( padLen ) {
+/* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
+PORT_Memset( ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen );
+return sftk_MACBlock( ctx, ctx->padBuf );
+} else
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
+* setup and final operations).
+*
+* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+					CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type, PR_TRUE, &session );
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (context->hashInfo) {
+	(*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+} else {
+	/* must be block cipher MACing */
+unsigned int  blkSize   = context->blockSize;
+unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
+context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
+unsigned int  minInput  = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
+blkSize - context->padDataLength;
+/* not enough data even for one block */
+if( ulPartLen < minInput ) {
+PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, ulPartLen );
+context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
+goto cleanup;
+}
+/* MACing residual */
+if( context->padDataLength ) {
+PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, minInput );
+ulPartLen -= minInput;
+pPart     += minInput;
+if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, context->padBuf )) )
+goto terminate;
+}
+/* MACing full blocks */
+while( ulPartLen >= blkSize )
+{
+if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, pPart )) )
+goto terminate;
+ulPartLen -= blkSize;
+pPart     += blkSize;
+}
+/* save the residual */
+if( (context->padDataLength = ulPartLen) )
+PORT_Memcpy( context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen );
+} /* blk cipher MACing */
+goto  cleanup;
+terminate:
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, type, context );
+cleanup:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+*
+* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+*/
+CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+							CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
+}
+/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
+* returning the signature. */
+CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+					    CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (context->hashInfo) {
+unsigned int digestLen;
+unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+if( !pSignature ) {
+outlen = context->maxLen; goto finish;
+}
+(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+if( SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+&outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+/* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
+* Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
+* application read EXACT signature length */
+} else {
+/* must be block cipher MACing */
+outlen = context->macSize;
+/* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
+if( !pSignature  ||  maxoutlen < outlen ) {
+if( pSignature ) crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+goto finish;
+}
+if( CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal( context )) )
+	    PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen );
+}
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_SIGN, context );
+finish:
+*pulSignatureLen = outlen;
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
+* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+					CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (!pSignature) {
+/* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
+	*pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
+? context->maxLen
+: context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
+	goto finish;
+}
+/* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
+* sign Final */
+if (context->multi) {
+/* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
+	if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen) ))
+crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
+} else {
+	/* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+if( SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+&outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
+crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+*pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
+/*  "too small" here is certainly continuable */
+if( crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
+sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+} /* single-part */
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Sign Recover  ************************
+*/
+/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
+* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+			 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+	return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey);
+default:
+	break;
+}
+return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
+* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen);
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     verify  ************************
+*/
+/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
+digestLen);
+}
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
+const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+SECItem it;
+SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+it.data = NULL;
+it.len = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(key);
+if (!it.len) {
+goto loser;
+}
+it.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
+if (it.data == NULL) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* decrypt the block */
+rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig,
+sigLen);
+if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+goto loser;
+}
+di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
+if (di == NULL) {
+goto loser;
+}
+if (di->digest.len != hashLen) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* make sure the tag is OK */
+if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != hashOid) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
+if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
+goto loser;
+}
+/* Now check the signature */
+if (PORT_Memcmp(hash, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) {
+goto done;
+}
+loser:
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+rv = SECFailure;
+done:
+if (it.data != NULL) {
+PORT_Free(it.data);
+}
+if (di != NULL) {
+SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+}
+return rv;
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
+PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
+* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
+CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+			   CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
+if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type,
+						CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \
+case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
+context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
+	crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
+	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \
+	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \
+	if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
+	info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
+	goto finish_rsa;
+switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
+INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSign;
+	goto finish_rsa;
+case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
+finish_rsa:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    if (info) PORT_Free(info);
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	if (pubKey == NULL) {
+	    if (info) PORT_Free(info);
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (info) {
+	    info->key = pubKey;
+	    context->cipherInfo = info;
+	    context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+	} else {
+	    context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+	    context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+	}
+	break;
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+	    !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);
+	if (info == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+	info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	if (info->key == NULL) {
+	    PORT_Free(info);
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = info;
+	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
+	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
+	break;
+case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_DSA:
+	if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
+	if (pubKey == NULL) {
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+	context->verify     = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
+	context->destroy    = sftk_Null;
+	break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
+	context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	/* fall through */
+case CKM_ECDSA:
+	if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
+	if (pubKey == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+	context->verify     = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
+	context->destroy    = sftk_Null;
+	break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
+				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
+	break;
+case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
+					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
+					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+	break;
+case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL);
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256);
+	break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	if (info) PORT_Free(info);
+sftk_FreeContext(context);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+/* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
+* VerifyFinal */
+if (context->multi) {
+/* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
+	if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
+crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+} else {
+if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature,
+ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
+crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
+}
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
+* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+*
+* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+*/
+CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+						CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
+}
+/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
+* checking the signature. */
+CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+			CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (!pSignature)
+	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK)
+	return crv;
+if (context->hashInfo) {
+unsigned int digestLen;
+unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+if( SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+} else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
+	/* must be block cipher MACing */
+	crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
+} else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
+	if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
+	    crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+}
+sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+************** Crypto Functions:     Verify  Recover ************************
+*/
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+sig, sigLen);
+}
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+return SECFailure;
+}
+return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+sig, sigLen);
+}
+/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
+* where the data is recovered from the signature.
+* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+			CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+CHECK_FORK();
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+			&key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
+	if (pubKey == NULL) {
+	    break;
+	}
+	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+			? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
+	context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+	break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+PORT_Free(context);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return crv;
+}
+sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+* where the data is recovered from the signature.
+* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+		 CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
+				CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+unsigned int outlen;
+unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+CK_RV crv;
+SECStatus rv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+							PR_FALSE,&session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+if (pData == NULL) {
+	/* to return the actual size, we need  to do the decrypt, just return
+	 * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
+	*pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
+	rv = SECSuccess;
+	goto finish;
+}
+rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+						pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
+sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+finish:
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return (rv == SECSuccess)  ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/*
+**************************** Random Functions:  ************************
+*/
+/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
+* generator. */
+CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
+CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
+return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR	pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
+{
+SECStatus rv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
+/*
+* This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
+* seeded with enough entropy.
+*/
+return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+/*
+**************************** Key Functions:  ************************
+*/
+/*
+* generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
+* PKCS5 to do the work.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+			void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
+CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+*key_length = 0;
+iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0;
+if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+	pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
+	/* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
+	pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
+} else {
+	pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
+	pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
+}
+pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
+if (pbe_key == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
+*key_length = pbe_key->len;
+SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
+pbe_key = NULL;
+if (iv.data) {
+if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
+	    PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
+}
+PORT_Free(iv.data);
+}
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+* this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
+* the official subset by freebl.
+*/
+static unsigned int
+sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
+{
+if (primeBits <= 1024) {
+	return 160;
+} else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
+	return 224;
+} else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
+	return 256;
+} else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
+	return 384;
+} else {
+	return 512;
+}
+}
+static CK_RV
+nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+CK_ULONG counter;
+unsigned int seedBits = 0;
+unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
+unsigned int primeBits;
+unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+PQGParams *params = NULL;
+PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
+SECStatus rv;
+attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+if (attribute == NULL) {
+	return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+}
+primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+if (primeBits < 1024) {
+	j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
+	if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
+	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	}
+}
+attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+if (attribute != NULL) {
+	seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+}
+attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+if (attribute != NULL) {
+	subprimeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+}
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+/* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
+if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
+	if (seedBits == 0) {
+	    rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, &params, &vfy);
+	} else {
+	    rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
+	}
+} else {
+	if (subprimeBits == 0) {
+	    subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
+}
+	if (seedBits == 0) {
+	    seedBits = primeBits;
+	}
+	rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
+}
+if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+	    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+	}
+	return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME,
+				 params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME,
+				 params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE,
+				 params->base.data, params->base.len);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+counter = vfy->counter;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER,
+				 &counter, sizeof(counter));
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED,
+				 vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H,
+				 vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+loser:
+PQG_DestroyParams(params);
+if (vfy) {
+	PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
+}
+return crv;
+}
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
+							CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+switch (mechanism) {
+case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_RC2;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_RC5;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+#endif
+case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_RC4;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_CDMF;
+	*key_length = 8;
+	break;
+case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_DES;
+	*key_length = 8;
+	break;
+case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_DES2;
+	*key_length = 16;
+	break;
+case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_DES3;
+	*key_length = 24;
+	break;
+case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_SEED;
+	*key_length = 16;
+	break;
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_AES;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+	*key_type = CKK_NSS_CHACHA20;
+	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	break;
+default:
+	PORT_Assert(0);
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+return crv;
+}
+CK_RV
+nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
+{
+SECItem  salt;
+CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
+PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+SECStatus rv;
+*pbe = NULL;
+arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+if (arena == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+				sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
+if (params == NULL) {
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+params->poolp = arena;
+params->ivLen = 0;
+params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
+params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
+params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
+pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,&params->salt,&salt);
+if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+	params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+	params->keyLen = 20;
+	break;
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+	params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
+	params->keyLen = 16;
+	break;
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+	params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
+	params->keyLen = 16;
+	break;
+default:
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
+	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+*pbe = params;
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* maybe this should be table driven? */
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter  **pbe,
+				CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+SECOidData *oid;
+CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
+CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+SECItem salt;
+CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
+*pbe = NULL;
+oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
+if (oid == NULL) {
+	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+	pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
+	    return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	}
+	salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
+	salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+	iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
+} else {
+	pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+	salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+	iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+}
+params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, iteration);
+if (params == NULL) {
+	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+switch (params->encAlg) {
+case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
+	*key_type = CKK_DES;
+	*key_length = params->keyLen;
+	break;
+case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
+	*key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
+	*key_length = params->keyLen;
+	break;
+case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
+	*key_type = CKK_RC2;
+	*key_length = params->keyLen;
+	break;
+case SEC_OID_RC4:
+	*key_type = CKK_RC4;
+	*key_length = params->keyLen;
+	break;
+case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
+	/* sigh, PKCS #11 currently only defines SHA1 for the KDF hash type.
+	 * we do the check here because this where we would handle multiple
+	 * hash types in the future */
+	if (pbkd2_params == NULL ||
+		pbkd2_params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* key type must already be set */
+	if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
+	 */
+	if (*key_length == 0) {
+	    *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
+	}
+	if (*key_length == 0) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	params->keyLen = *key_length;
+	break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
+	break;
+}
+if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+	*pbe = params;
+}
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount,
+						CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSession *session;
+PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
+CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+int i;
+SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param, nsc_jpake} key_gen_type;
+NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
+SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+CK_VERSION *version;
+/* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
+* generation methods.  We want to beable to read these, but not
+* produce them any more.  The affected algorithm was 3DES.
+*/
+PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
+HASH_HashType hashType;
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (!slot) {
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+*/
+key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+if (key == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+/*
+* load the template values into the object
+*/
+for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) {
+	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+	    key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	/* some algorithms need keytype specified */
+	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+	    key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return crv;
+}
+/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE);
+/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+	checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
+/* fall through */
+case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+#endif
+	crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length);
+	break;
+case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
+	key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	key_length = 48;
+	key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
+	break;
+case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+	key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+	key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
+	break;
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
+	faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
+/* fall through */
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
+case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
+case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
+case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
+case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
+case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
+	key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+	crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
+	break;
+case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
+	key_gen_type = nsc_param;
+	key_type = CKK_DSA;
+	objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
+	crv = CKR_OK;
+	break;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1:   hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;   goto jpake1;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake1;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake1;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake1;
+jpake1:
+	key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
+	key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
+objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
+crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+break;
+}
+if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
+crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+break;
+}
+crv = CKR_OK;
+break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+	break;
+}
+/* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
+if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
+	/* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
+	 * be... */
+crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+/* if there was no error,
+* key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
+PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE );
+/*
+* now to the actual key gen.
+*/
+switch (key_gen_type) {
+case nsc_pbe:
+	crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
+			       faultyPBE3DES);
+	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
+	break;
+case nsc_ssl:
+	rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
+	version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
+rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
+crv =
+	    NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
+	break;
+case nsc_bulk:
+	/* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
+	do {
+crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
+	} while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type));
+	break;
+case nsc_param:
+	/* generate parameters */
+	*buf = 0;
+	crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key);
+	break;
+case nsc_jpake:
+crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
+(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
+key);
+break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+/* Add the class, key_type, and value */
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+if (key_length != 0) {
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+}
+/* get the session */
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* handle the base object stuff
+*/
+crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+*phKey = key->handle;
+sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return crv;
+}
+#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH			SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
+#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH			20          /* 160-bits */
+/*
+* FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
+*
+* This function returns
+*   CKR_OK               if pairwise consistency check passed
+*   CKR_GENERAL_ERROR    if pairwise consistency check failed
+*   other error codes    if paiswise consistency check could not be
+*                        performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+/*
+*                      Key type    Mechanism type
+*                      --------------------------------
+* For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+*                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+*
+* For sign/verify:     CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+*                      CKK_DSA  => CKM_DSA
+*                      CKK_EC   => CKM_ECDSA
+*                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+*
+* None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
+*/
+CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0};
+CK_ULONG modulusLen;
+CK_ULONG subPrimeLen;
+PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
+PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
+PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
+CK_RV crv;
+/* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
+unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
+unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
+CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
+unsigned char *ciphertext;
+unsigned char *text_compared;
+CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
+CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
+CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+/* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
+/* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
+unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)
+				"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
+unsigned char *signature;
+CK_ULONG signature_length;
+if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
+	SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+	/* Get modulus length of private key. */
+	attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+	if (attribute == NULL) {
+	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+	}
+	modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+	    modulusLen--;
+	}
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+} else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
+	SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+	/* Get subprime length of private key. */
+	attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+	if (attribute == NULL) {
+	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+	}
+	subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+	    subPrimeLen--;
+	}
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+}
+/**************************************************/
+/* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
+/**************************************************/
+isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
+/*
+* If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
+* with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
+*/
+if (isEncryptable) {
+	if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
+	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+	}
+	bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
+	mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+	/* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
+	ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
+	if (ciphertext == NULL) {
+	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	}
+	/* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
+	crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	/* Encrypt using the public key. */
+	crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
+			  known_message,
+			  PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
+			  ciphertext,
+			  &bytes_encrypted);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	/* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
+	bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+	/*
+	 * If there was a failure, the plaintext
+	 * goes at the end, therefore . . .
+	 */
+	text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
+	/*
+	 * Check to ensure that ciphertext does
+	 * NOT EQUAL known input message text
+	 * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
+	 */
+	if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
+			bytes_compared) == 0) {
+	    /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
+	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	/* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
+	crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+	/*
+	 * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
+	 * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
+	 */
+	bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
+	/*
+	 * Decrypt using the private key.
+	 * NOTE:  No need to reset the
+	 *        value of bytes_encrypted.
+	 */
+	crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
+			  ciphertext,
+			  bytes_encrypted,
+			  plaintext,
+			  &bytes_decrypted);
+	/* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
+	PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check to ensure that the output plaintext
+	 * does EQUAL known input message text.
+	 */
+	if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
+	    (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
+			 PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
+	    /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
+	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+	}
+}
+/**********************************************/
+/* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
+/**********************************************/
+canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
+if (canSignVerify) {
+	/* Determine length of signature. */
+	switch (keyType) {
+	case CKK_RSA:
+	    signature_length = modulusLen;
+	    mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+	    break;
+	case CKK_DSA:
+	    signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	    pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
+	    mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
+	    break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+	case CKK_EC:
+	    signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+	    mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+	    break;
+#endif
+	default:
+	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+	}
+	/* Allocate space for signature data. */
+	signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
+	if (signature == NULL) {
+	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	}
+	/* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
+	crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(signature);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
+		       known_digest,
+		       pairwise_digest_length,
+		       signature,
+		       &signature_length);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(signature);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	/* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
+	crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(signature);
+	    return crv;
+	}
+	crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
+			 known_digest,
+			 pairwise_digest_length,
+			 signature,
+			 signature_length);
+	/* Free signature data. */
+	PORT_Free(signature);
+	if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
+		(crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
+	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    return crv;
+	}
+}
+/**********************************************/
+/* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation  */
+/**********************************************/
+isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
+if (isDerivable) {
+	/*
+	 * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key -
+	 * otherwise it would be here
+	 * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys
+	 * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise
+	 * consistency check for signing/verification.
+	 */
+	/*
+	 * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for
+	 * public and private keys used for key agreement:
+	 *   If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the
+	 *   cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible
+	 *   key pair.  The cryptographic module shall perform both
+	 *   sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare
+	 *   the resulting shared values.  If the shared values are
+	 *   not equal, the test shall fail.
+	 * This test was removed in Change Notice 3.
+	 */
+}
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
+* creating new key objects. */
+CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
+CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
+CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
+					CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
+{
+SFTKObject *	publicKey,*privateKey;
+SFTKSession *	session;
+CK_KEY_TYPE 	key_type;
+CK_RV 		crv 	= CKR_OK;
+CK_BBOOL 		cktrue 	= CK_TRUE;
+SECStatus 		rv;
+CK_OBJECT_CLASS 	pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+CK_OBJECT_CLASS 	privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+int 		i;
+SFTKSlot *		slot 	= sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+unsigned int bitSize;
+/* RSA */
+int 		public_modulus_bits = 0;
+SECItem 		pubExp;
+RSAPrivateKey *	rsaPriv;
+/* DSA */
+PQGParams 		pqgParam;
+DHParams  		dhParam;
+DSAPrivateKey *	dsaPriv;
+/* Diffie Hellman */
+int 		private_value_bits = 0;
+DHPrivateKey *	dhPriv;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+/* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
+SECItem  		ecEncodedParams;  /* DER Encoded parameters */
+ECPrivateKey *	ecPriv;
+ECParams *          ecParams;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (!slot) {
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+*/
+publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+if (publicKey == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+/*
+* load the template values into the publicKey
+*/
+for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+	if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
+	    public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
+				    sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+if (privateKey == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+/*
+* now load the private key template
+*/
+for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+	if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
+	    private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
+				    sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
+/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+	/* format the keys */
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT);
+	key_type = CKK_RSA;
+	if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
+	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* extract the exponent */
+	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
+	if (bitSize < 2) {
+	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+				    		    sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
+	PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
+	if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
+	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
+kpg_done:
+	/* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
+	PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+	break;
+case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
+	key_type = CKK_DSA;
+	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
+	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey,
+	                            CKA_SUBPRIME);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME,
+			    	    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE,
+			    	    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * these are checked by DSA_NewKey
+	 */
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
+							pqgParam.subPrime.len);
+if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS))  {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len);
+if ((bitSize <  DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len);
+if ((bitSize <  2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* Generate the key */
+	rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
+	PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+	PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+	PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* store the generated key into the attributes */
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
+/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
+dsagn_done:
+	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+	PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
+	break;
+case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+	key_type = CKK_DH;
+	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
+				      CKA_PRIME);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len);
+if ((bitSize <  DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len);
+if ((bitSize <  1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
+	PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+	PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
+				sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
+	crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+			      sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
+dhgn_done:
+	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+	PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+	break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
+	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+	key_type = CKK_EC;
+	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+	crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
+				      CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	  PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
+	  break;
+	}
+	/* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
+	rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
+	PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
+	PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (getenv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+				sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+	} else {
+	    SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+					&ecPriv->publicValue,
+					SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+	    if (!pubValue) {
+		crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+		goto ecgn_done;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+				sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
+	    SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+	}
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+			      sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
+crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+			   sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+ecgn_done:
+	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+	PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
+	break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	return crv;
+}
+/* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
+*  on errors and clean up at the bottom */
+session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
+		    /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
+do {
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass,
+						sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass,
+						sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
+						sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
+						sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+} while (0);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	 sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	 sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	 return crv;
+}
+/*
+* handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
+*/
+crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	return crv;
+}
+/*
+* handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
+* If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
+* created and linked.
+*/
+crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
+	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	return crv;
+}
+if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+	sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+}
+/* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
+crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession,
+					publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle);
+	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
+	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+	if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
+	    char msg[128];
+	    PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg,
+			"C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
+			"pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
+			"self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
+			(PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
+			(PRUint32)crv);
+	    sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
+	}
+	return crv;
+}
+*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
+{
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
+PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+void *dummy, *param = NULL;
+SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+SECItem *fordebug;
+int savelen;
+#endif
+if(!key) {
+	*crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
+	return NULL;
+}
+attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+if(!attribute) {
+	*crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	return NULL;
+}
+lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
+sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+if(!lk) {
+	return NULL;
+}
+arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); 	/* XXX different size? */
+if(!arena) {
+	*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+}
+pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+					sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+if(!pki) {
+	*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+}
+pki->arena = arena;
+param = NULL;
+switch(lk->keyType) {
+	case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+	    prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+				       nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
+	    algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+	    break;
+	case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
+	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+				       nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
+	    prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
+	    param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
+				       nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
+	    algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+	    break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+	    /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
+	     * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
+	     * immediately after.
+	     *
+	     * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
+	     * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
+	     * length before encoding and restore it later.
+	     */
+	    lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
+	    savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
+	    lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
+	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+				       nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
+	    lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
+	    lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+	    fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
+	    SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
+		      fordebug);
+	    param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+	    algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	    break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+	case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+	default:
+	    dummy = NULL;
+	    break;
+}
+if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
+	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+}
+rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
+			       (SECItem*)param);
+if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+}
+dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
+				  NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
+if(!dummy) {
+	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+	rv = SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+}
+encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
+				    nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
+*crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+fordebug = encodedKey;
+SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
+	      fordebug);
+#endif
+loser:
+if(arena) {
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+}
+if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
+	nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
+}
+if(param) {
+	SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE);
+}
+if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+	return NULL;
+}
+return encodedKey;
+}
+/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
+* level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
+{
+switch (crv) {
+case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID:  crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break;
+}
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
+					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
+{
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+SFTKObject *key;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) {
+	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+if (key == NULL) {
+	return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+switch(key->objclass) {
+	case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
+	  {
+	    SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+	    SECItem pText;
+	    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+	    if (attribute == NULL) {
+		crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+				CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    pText.type = siBuffer;
+	    pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+	    pText.len  = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	    /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
+	    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
+	        break;
+	    if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+		unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
+	        if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
+		    /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
+		    ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
+		    ** a full block.
+		    */
+		    pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
+		    pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+		    if (pText.data)
+			memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
+			                   attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
+		    else {
+			crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
+		              pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+	    /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
+	     * we are just getting the size */
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+	    	CK_RV lcrv ;
+		lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
+				       SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
+		sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+	    	if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
+		    sftk_FreeContext(context);
+		}
+	    }
+	    if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
+	    	PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+	    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+	    break;
+	  }
+	case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
+	    {
+		SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
+		SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+		if(!bpki) {
+		    break;
+		}
+		crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+				CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+		if(crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+		    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+		    break;
+		}
+		crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
+					pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+		/* always force a finalize */
+		if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+	    	    CK_RV lcrv ;
+		    lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
+					   SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
+		    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+	    	    if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context)  {
+			sftk_FreeContext(context);
+		    }
+		}
+		SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+		break;
+	    }
+	default:
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+}
+sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+}
+/*
+* import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
+*/
+static SECStatus
+sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
+{
+CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
+SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
+void *paramDest = NULL;
+PLArenaPool *arena;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
+NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
+if(!arena) {
+	return SECFailure;
+}
+pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+					sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+if(!pki) {
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+	return SECFailure;
+}
+if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki)
+				!= SECSuccess) {
+	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+	return SECFailure;
+}
+lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+						  sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
+if(lpk == NULL) {
+	goto loser;
+}
+lpk->arena = arena;
+switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
+	case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
+	    paramTemplate = NULL;
+	    paramDest = NULL;
+	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
+	    prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+	    break;
+	case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
+	    paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
+	    paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
+	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
+	    prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
+	    prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
+	    break;
+	/* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
+	    paramTemplate = NULL;
+	    paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
+	    prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+	    prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
+	    break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+	default:
+	    keyTemplate = NULL;
+	    paramTemplate = NULL;
+	    paramDest = NULL;
+	    break;
+}
+if(!keyTemplate) {
+	goto loser;
+}
+/* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
+rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
+/* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
+	lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
+			      &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
+	                      &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+	if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    goto loser;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+	goto loser;
+}
+if(paramDest && paramTemplate) {
+	rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
+				 &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+	if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    goto loser;
+	}
+}
+rv = SECFailure;
+switch (lpk->keyType) {
+case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+	    keyType = CKK_RSA;
+	    if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
+		sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+	    }
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+					sizeof(keyType));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
+					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
+					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+				    sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
+				sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
+				sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
+	    break;
+case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
+	    crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
+						CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+						sizeof(keyType));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+				 sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
+				    sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    break;
+#ifdef notdef
+case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+	    template = dhTemplate;
+	    templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+	    keyType = CKK_DH;
+	    break;
+#endif
+	/* what about fortezza??? */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+	    keyType = CKK_EC;
+	    crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
+						CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+						sizeof(keyType));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
+						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+				 sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
+	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
+	    break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+	default:
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+}
+loser:
+if(lpk) {
+	nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
+}
+if(crv != CKR_OK) {
+	return SECFailure;
+}
+return SECSuccess;
+}
+/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
+CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
+CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+						 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+SFTKSession *session;
+CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+unsigned char * buf = NULL;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+int i;
+CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+SECItem bpki;
+CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (!slot) {
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+*/
+key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+if (key == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+/*
+* load the template values into the object
+*/
+for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+	    key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	    continue;
+	}
+if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
+	    target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return crv;
+}
+crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP,
+					CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+}
+/* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
+* this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
+* wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
+buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen);
+bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	PORT_Free(buf);
+	return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+}
+switch(target_type) {
+	case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
+	    if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
+		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
+		key_length = bsize;
+	    }
+	    if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
+		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    /* add the value */
+	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
+	    break;
+	case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
+	    bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
+	    bpki.len = bsize;
+	    crv = CKR_OK;
+	    if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
+		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+}
+PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+/* get the session */
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* handle the base object stuff
+*/
+crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
+*phKey = key->handle;
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+* The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
+* details of each of these key creation.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
+PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
+						 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
+{
+SFTKObject *key;
+SFTKSession *session;
+CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+/*
+* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+*/
+*keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
+if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+if (isMacKey) {
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+}
+crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
+/* get the session */
+crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) { goto loser; }
+crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+*keyHandle = key->handle;
+loser:
+if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return crv;
+}
+/*
+* if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
+* This is the routine that will do it..
+*/
+static void
+sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+				CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial )
+{
+	if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+	   NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
+	}
+	if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
+	}
+	if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
+	}
+	if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
+	}
+}
+/*
+* when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
+* of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
+* semantics.
+*/
+static CK_RV
+sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey)
+{
+PRBool hasSensitive;
+PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
+PRBool hasExtractable;
+PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+SFTKAttribute *att;
+hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
+if (att) {
+hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
+	sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+}
+hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+if (att) {
+hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
+	extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+}
+/* don't make a key more accessible */
+if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
+						(sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
+	return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+}
+if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
+						(extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
+	return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+}
+/* inherit parent's sensitivity */
+if (!hasSensitive) {
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
+	if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+}
+if (!hasExtractable) {
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+	if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+}
+/* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
+* but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
+* something special. */
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+/*
+* make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
+*/
+unsigned long
+sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+switch (keyType) {
+case CKK_CDMF:
+	return 8;
+case CKK_DES:
+	return 8;
+case CKK_DES2:
+	return 16;
+case CKK_DES3:
+	return 24;
+/* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
+default:
+	break;
+}
+return 0;
+}
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+/* Inputs:
+*  key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
+*  SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
+*  SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
+*  SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
+*  Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
+*  HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
+* Output:
+*  key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
+*/
+static CK_RV sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
+		CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+		SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
+		CK_ULONG HashLen)
+{
+unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
+PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
+SECStatus rv;
+CK_RV crv;
+/* Check that key_len isn't too long.  The maximum key length could be
+* greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
+* to a maximum value of 255. */
+if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
+	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+if (SharedInfo == NULL)
+	SharedInfoLen = 0;
+buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
+buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
+if (buffer == NULL) {
+	crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	goto loser;
+}
+max_counter = key_len/HashLen;
+if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
+	max_counter++;
+output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
+if (output_buffer == NULL) {
+	crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	goto loser;
+}
+/* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
+* where Counter is 0x00000001 */
+PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
+buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
+buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
+buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
+buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
+if (SharedInfo) {
+	PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
+}
+for(i=0; i < max_counter; i++) {
+	rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    /* 'Hash' should not fail. */
+	    crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+	    goto loser;
+	}
+	/* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
+	buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
+}
+PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
+	PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
+}
+*key = output_buffer;
+return CKR_OK;
+loser:
+	if (buffer) {
+	    PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+	}
+	if (output_buffer) {
+	    PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
+	}
+	return crv;
+}
+static CK_RV sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
+		SECItem *SharedSecret,
+		CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+		CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
+{
+if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
+	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
+else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
+	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
+else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
+	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
+else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
+	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
+else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
+	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
+else
+	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+/*
+* SSL Key generation given pre master secret
+*/
+#define NUM_MIXERS 9
+static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
+"A",
+"BB",
+"CCC",
+"DDDD",
+"EEEEE",
+"FFFFFF",
+"GGGGGGG",
+"HHHHHHHH",
+"IIIIIIIII" };
+#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
+/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+	 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
+	 CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+						CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+SFTKSession *   session;
+SFTKSlot    *   slot	= sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+SFTKObject  *   key;
+SFTKObject  *   sourceKey;
+SFTKAttribute * att = NULL;
+SFTKAttribute * att2 = NULL;
+unsigned char * buf;
+SHA1Context *   sha;
+MD5Context *    md5;
+MD2Context *    md2;
+CK_ULONG        macSize;
+CK_ULONG        tmpKeySize;
+CK_ULONG        IVSize;
+CK_ULONG        keySize	= 0;
+CK_RV           crv 	= CKR_OK;
+CK_BBOOL        cktrue	= CK_TRUE;
+CK_KEY_TYPE     keyType	= CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType	= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
+PRBool          isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+PRBool          isSHA256 = PR_FALSE;
+PRBool          isDH = PR_FALSE;
+SECStatus       rv;
+int             i;
+unsigned int    outLen;
+unsigned char   sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
+unsigned char   key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
+unsigned char   key_block2[MD5_LENGTH];
+PRBool          isFIPS;
+HASH_HashType   hashType;
+PRBool          extractValue = PR_TRUE;
+CHECK_FORK();
+if (!slot) {
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+/*
+* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+*/
+if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+if (key == NULL) {
+	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+}
+isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
+/*
+* load the template values into the object
+*/
+for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+	    keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	}
+	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+	    keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+	}
+}
+if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
+if (keySize == 0) {
+	keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
+}
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1:   /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
+extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+break;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1:   /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
+extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+/* fall through */
+default:
+classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+}
+crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType));
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return crv;
+}
+/* look up the base key we're deriving with */
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+if (sourceKey == NULL) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+if (extractValue) {
+/* get the value of the base key */
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE);
+if (att == NULL) {
+sftk_FreeObject(key);
+sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+}
+switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+/*
+* generate the master secret
+*/
+case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
+case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
+	isSHA256 = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+	isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+{
+	CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
+	SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *          rsa_pms;
+	unsigned char                     crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256))
+		isDH = PR_TRUE;
+	/* first do the consistancy checks */
+	if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+	if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+					CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+	    if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+	    break;
+	}
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* finally do the key gen */
+	ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
+					pMechanism->pParameter;
+	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
+	            ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+	            ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
+	    SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+	    rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
+	    /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
+	    if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
+		ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
+		ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
+	    } else {
+		ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
+		ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
+	    }
+	}
+	if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+	   crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	   break;
+	}
+	if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+	   crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	   break;
+	}
+if (isTLS) {
+	    SECStatus status;
+	    SECItem crsr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    SECItem pms    = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    crsr.data   = crsrdata;
+	    crsr.len    = sizeof crsrdata;
+	    master.data = key_block;
+	    master.len  = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+	    pms.data    = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
+	    pms.len     =                 att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	    if (isSHA256) {
+		status = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &pms, "master secret",
+				    &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+	    } else {
+		status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+	    }
+	    if (status != SECSuccess) {
+	    	crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+		break;
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    /* now allocate the hash contexts */
+	    md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+	    if (md5 == NULL) {
+		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+	    if (sha == NULL) {
+		PORT_Free(md5);
+		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+		break;
+	    }
+for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+SHA1_Begin(sha);
+SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			  att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
+SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+MD5_Begin(md5);
+MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			 att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+}
+	    PORT_Free(md5);
+	    PORT_Free(sha);
+	}
+	/* store the results */
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute
+			(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
+	if (isTLS) {
+	    /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
+	    /* XXX This seems like a hack.   But SFTK_Derive only accepts
+	     * one "operation" argument. */
+	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,  &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
+	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	}
+	break;
+}
+case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
+	isSHA256 = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+	isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+	/* fall thru */
+case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+{
+	CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
+	CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *   ssl3_keys_out;
+	CK_ULONG                effKeySize;
+	unsigned int            block_needed;
+	unsigned char           srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+	unsigned char           crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+	    break;
+	}
+	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+	if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+					CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+	    if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+	    break;
+	}
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+	if (md5 == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+	if (sha == NULL) {
+	    PORT_Free(md5);
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
+	PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
+	            ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
+		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+	/*
+	 * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
+	 */
+	ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+	ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey       = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey       = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	/*
+	 * How much key material do we need?
+	 */
+	macSize    = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8;
+	effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8;
+	IVSize     = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8;
+	if (keySize == 0) {
+	    effKeySize = keySize;
+	}
+	block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize +
+	                    ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize));
+	PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
+	if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
+	    block_needed = sizeof key_block;
+	/*
+	 * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
+	 * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
+	 */
+	if (isTLS) {
+	    SECStatus     status;
+	    SECItem       srcr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    SECItem       keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    SECItem       master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+	    srcr.data   = srcrdata;
+	    srcr.len    = sizeof srcrdata;
+	    keyblk.data = key_block;
+	    keyblk.len  = block_needed;
+	    master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
+	    master.len  =                 att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	    if (isSHA256) {
+		status = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &master, "key expansion",
+				    &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+	    } else {
+		status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
+				 isFIPS);
+	    }
+	    if (status != SECSuccess) {
+		goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
+	    /* key_block =
+	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
+	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
+	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
+	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+	     *     [...];
+	     */
+	    for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
+	      SHA1_Begin(sha);
+	      SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+	      SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			  att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	      SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
+	      SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+	      PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+	      MD5_Begin(md5);
+	      MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+			 att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	      MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+	      MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+	      PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+	      block_bytes += outLen;
+	    }
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Put the key material where it goes.
+	 */
+	i = 0;			/* now shows how much consumed */
+	/*
+	 * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
+	 * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+	 */
+	crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
+					 &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK)
+	    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+	i += macSize;
+	/*
+	 * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+	 */
+	crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
+					    &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+	}
+	i += macSize;
+	if (keySize) {
+	    if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
+		/*
+		** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
+		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		*/
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
+					keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		i += keySize;
+		/*
+		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		*/
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
+					keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		i += keySize;
+		/*
+		** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+		*/
+		if (IVSize > 0) {
+		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
+		                &key_block[i], IVSize);
+		    i += IVSize;
+		}
+		/*
+		** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+		*/
+		if (IVSize > 0) {
+		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
+		                &key_block[i], IVSize);
+		    i += IVSize;
+		}
+		PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
+	    } else if (!isTLS) {
+		/*
+		** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
+		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
+		**                   ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
+		*/
+		MD5_Begin(md5);
+		MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
+	MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
+		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+		i += effKeySize;
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
+				 	keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		/*
+		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
+		**                    ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
+		*/
+		MD5_Begin(md5);
+		MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
+	MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
+		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+		i += effKeySize;
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
+					 keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		/*
+		** client_write_IV =
+		**	MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
+		*/
+		MD5_Begin(md5);
+	MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
+		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+		PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize);
+		/*
+		** server_write_IV =
+		**	MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
+		*/
+		MD5_Begin(md5);
+	MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
+		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+		PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize);
+	    } else {
+		/*
+		** Generate TLS 1.0 Export write keys and IVs.
+		*/
+		SECStatus     status;
+		SECItem       secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+		SECItem       crsr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+		SECItem       keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+		/*
+		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
+		**                              "client write key",
+		**                              client_random + server_random);
+		*/
+		secret.data = &key_block[i];
+		secret.len  = effKeySize;
+		i          += effKeySize;
+		crsr.data   = crsrdata;
+		crsr.len    = sizeof crsrdata;
+		keyblk.data = key_block2;
+		keyblk.len  = sizeof key_block2;
+		status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
+				  isFIPS);
+		if (status != SECSuccess) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
+				       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		/*
+		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+		** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
+		**                              "server write key",
+		**                              client_random + server_random);
+		*/
+		secret.data = &key_block[i];
+		secret.len  = effKeySize;
+		i          += effKeySize;
+		keyblk.data = key_block2;
+		keyblk.len  = sizeof key_block2;
+		status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
+				  isFIPS);
+		if (status != SECSuccess) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
+				       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
+		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		}
+		/*
+		** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block",
+		**                    client_random + server_random);
+		** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
+		** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
+		*/
+		if (IVSize) {
+		    secret.data = NULL;
+		    secret.len  = 0;
+		    keyblk.data = &key_block[i];
+		    keyblk.len  = 2 * IVSize;
+		    status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk,
+				      isFIPS);
+		    if (status != SECSuccess) {
+			goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+		    }
+		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize);
+		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize,
+IVSize);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	crv = CKR_OK;
+	if (0) {
+key_and_mac_derive_fail:
+	    if (crv == CKR_OK)
+	    	crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+	    sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
+	}
+	MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+	SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	key = NULL;
+	break;
+}
+case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY:
+{
+	SFTKObject *newKey;
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+	if (session == NULL) {
+crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
+					pMechanism->pParameter,session);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	if ( newKey == NULL) {
+crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,
+							sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE);
+	if (att2 == NULL) {
+	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
+	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+				att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
+	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
+	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+	sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+	break;
+}
+case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter;
+	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
+	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData,
+							stringPtr->ulLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
+	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
+	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen);
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue,
+							att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
+	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen);
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
+	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize);
+	for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+	    buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
+	}
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
+	PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY:
+{
+	/* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
+	CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+	CK_ULONG shift   = extract & 0x7;      /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
+	CK_ULONG offset  = extract >> 3;       /* extract div 8 the fast way */
+	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
+	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	if (keySize == 0)  {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
+	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
+			(offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* copy the bits we need into the new key */
+	for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+	    unsigned char *value =
+			 ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i;
+	    if (shift) {
+	        buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
+	    } else {
+		buf[i] = value[0];
+	    }
+	}
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
+	PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
+	break;
+}
+case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* now allocate the hash contexts */
+	md2 = MD2_NewContext();
+	if (md2 == NULL) {
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	    break;
+	}
+	MD2_Begin(md2);
+	MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH);
+	MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	MD5_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	SHA1_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA224_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	SHA224_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA256_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	SHA256_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA384_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	SHA384_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
+	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA512_LENGTH;
+	if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) {
+	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	    break;
+	}
+	SHA512_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
+		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
+	break;
+case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
+{
+	SECItem  derived,  dhPublic;
+	SECItem  dhPrime,  dhValue;
+	/* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
+	/* get prime and value attributes */
+	crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
+	if (crv != SECSuccess) break;
+	crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+	if (crv != SECSuccess) {
+	    PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
+	    break;
+	}
+	dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
+	dhPublic.len  = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
+	/* calculate private value - oct */
+	rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
+	PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
+	PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
+	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+	    sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
+	    PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
+	} else
+	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	break;
+}
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
+case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
+{
+	SECItem  ecScalar, ecPoint;
+	SECItem  tmp;
+	PRBool   withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
+	unsigned char *secret;
+	unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
+	int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen;
+	CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
+	NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+	PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+	/* Check mechanism parameters */
+	mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
+	if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
+	    ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
+		((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
+		    (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
+	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+	    break;
+	}
+	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
+	if (privKey == NULL) {
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
+	SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
+	ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
+	ecPoint.len  = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
+	curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8;
+	pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1;
+	/* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */
+	if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) {
+	    goto ec_loser;
+	}
+	/* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is
+	 * equal case just falls through */
+	if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
+	    SECItem newPoint;
+	    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+	    if (arena == NULL) {
+		goto ec_loser;
+	    }
+	    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
+					SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
+					&ecPoint);
+	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+		goto ec_loser;
+	    }
+	    ecPoint = newPoint;
+	}
+	if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
+	    withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
+	} else {
+	    /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should
+	     * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup
+	     * attacks.
+	     */
+	    if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint)
+		!= SECSuccess) {
+		goto ec_loser;
+	    }
+	}
+	rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
+	                 withCofactor, &tmp);
+	PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
+	ecScalar.data = NULL;
+	if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
+	   nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+	   privKey=NULL;
+	}
+	if (arena) {
+	    PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
+	    arena=NULL;
+	}
+	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+	    break;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * apply the kdf function.
+	 */
+	if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
+	    /*
+	     * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
+	     * secret and secretlen are the values we will
+	     * eventually pass as our generated key.
+	     */
+	    secret = tmp.data;
+	    secretlen = tmp.len;
+	} else {
+	    secretlen = keySize;
+	    crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
+			&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
+			mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
+	    PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+		break;
+	    }
+	    tmp.data = secret;
+	    tmp.len = secretlen;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
+	 * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
+	 * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
+	 * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
+	 * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
+	 */
+	if (keySize) {
+	    if (secretlen < keySize) {
+	        keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
+		if (!keyData) {
+		    PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+		    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+		    break;
+		}
+		PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen);
+		secret = keyData;
+	    } else {
+		secret += (secretlen - keySize);
+	    }
+	    secretlen = keySize;
+	}
+	sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
+	PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+	if (keyData) {
+	    PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
+	}
+	break;
+ec_loser:
+	crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+	PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
+	if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
+	    nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+	if (arena) {
+	    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+	}
+	break;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+/* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
+case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1:   hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;   goto hkdf;
+case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto hkdf;
+case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto hkdf;
+case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto hkdf;
+hkdf: {
+const CK_NSS_HKDFParams * params =
+(const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *) pMechanism->pParameter;
+const SECHashObject * rawHash;
+unsigned hashLen;
+CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+CK_BYTE * prk;  /* psuedo-random key */
+CK_ULONG prkLen;
+CK_BYTE * okm;  /* output keying material */
+rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
+if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) {
+crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+break;
+}
+hashLen = rawHash->length;
+if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) ||
+!params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
+(params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
+(params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
+crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+break;
+}
+if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block ||
+(!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
+(params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
+crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+break;
+}
+crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+if (crv != CKR_OK)
+break;
+/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
+if (params->bExtract) {
+CK_BYTE * salt;
+CK_ULONG saltLen;
+HMACContext * hmac;
+unsigned int bufLen;
+salt = params->pSalt;
+saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
+if (salt == NULL) {
+saltLen = hashLen;
+salt = buf;
+memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
+}
+hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
+if (!hmac) {
+crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+break;
+}
+HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue,
+		        att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf));
+HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
+prk = buf;
+prkLen = bufLen;
+} else {
+/* PRK = base key value */
+prk = (CK_BYTE*) att->attrib.pValue;
+prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+}
+/* HKDF-Expand */
+if (!params->bExpand) {
+okm = prk;
+} else {
+/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
+*/
+HMACContext * hmac;
+CK_BYTE i;
+unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen;
+hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
+if (hmac == NULL) {
+crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+break;
+}
+for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
+unsigned len;
+HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+if (i > 1) {
+HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i-2) * hashLen), hashLen);
+}
+if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
+HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
+}
+HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1);
+HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i-1) * hashLen), &len,
+hashLen);
+PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
+}
+HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+okm = key_block;
+}
+/* key material = prk */
+crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
+break;
+} /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake2;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake2;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake2;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake2;
+jpake2:
+if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
+crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
+crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+	if (crv == CKR_OK)
+crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+	if (crv == CKR_OK)
+crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
+(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
+sourceKey, key);
+break;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpakeFinal;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpakeFinal;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpakeFinal;
+case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpakeFinal;
+jpakeFinal:
+if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
+crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+/* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
+able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
+ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
+in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
+in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
+sensitive.
+*/
+if (crv == CKR_OK)
+crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
+(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *) pMechanism->pParameter,
+sourceKey, key);
+break;
+default:
+	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+if (att) {
+sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+}
+sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+	if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return crv;
+}
+/* link the key object into the list */
+if (key) {
+	SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+	PORT_Assert(sessKey);
+	/* get the session */
+	sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+	if (session == NULL) {
+	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+	}
+	crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
+	sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	*phKey = key->handle;
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+}
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
+* in parallel with an application. */
+CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
+CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+CHECK_FORK();
+return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
+*operation in a session.
+* NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
+* to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
+* can be saved */
+CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+	CK_BYTE_PTR  pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
+{
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+SFTKSession *session;
+CK_RV crv;
+CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
+CHECK_FORK();
+/* make sure we're legal */
+crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+*pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)
+				+ sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+if (pOperationState == NULL) {
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	return CKR_OK;
+} else {
+	if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
+	    return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+	}
+}
+PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech,
+						sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+return CKR_OK;
+}
+#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \
+	stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \
+				((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
+/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+* operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
+* states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
+CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+	CK_BYTE_PTR  pOperationState, CK_ULONG  ulOperationStateLen,
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
+{
+SFTKSessionContext *context;
+SFTKSession *session;
+SFTKContextType type;
+CK_MECHANISM mech;
+CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+CHECK_FORK();
+while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
+	/* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
+	PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+	/* fix up session contexts based on type */
+	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+	if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+	context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
+	sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
+	if (context) {
+	     sftk_FreeContext(context);
+	}
+	pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+	sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+	/* get the mechanism structure */
+	PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+	pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+	sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+	/* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+	switch (type) {
+	case SFTK_HASH:
+	    crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
+								NULL);
+	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+	    PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState,
+						context->cipherInfoLen);
+	    pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
+	    sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen);
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
+	    crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
+}
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+	 if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
+}
+return crv;
+}
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
+* operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart,
+CK_ULONG  ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart,
+					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+						      pulEncryptedPartLen);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+* digesting operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG  ulEncryptedPartLen,
+				CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
+							pPart,	pulPartLen);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+* encryption operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart,
+	 CK_ULONG  ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart,
+					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+						      pulEncryptedPartLen);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+* and verify operation. */
+CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+	CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG  ulEncryptedDataLen,
+				CK_BYTE_PTR  pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
+							pData,	pulDataLen);
+if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
+crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
+return crv;
+}
+/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
+* by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
+*/
+CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+SFTKSession *session = NULL;
+SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+SFTKAttribute *att;
+CK_RV crv;
+CHECK_FORK();
+session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
+sftk_FreeSession(session);
+if (key == NULL)  return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+/* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
+/* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
+if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
+	sftk_FreeObject(key);
+	return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+}
+/* get the key value */
+att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
+sftk_FreeObject(key);
+if (!att) {
+return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+}
+crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
+			   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+return crv;
+}

Mercurial > trustbridge > nss-cmake-static

comparison nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c @ 0:1e5118fa0cb1